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Natural Theology and Epistemic Justification
SEBASTIAN REHNMAN
First it is argued that the linkage of natural theology to epistemology is invalid historically,
epistemologically and metaphysically. Second it is argued that knowledge claims about the ultimate
cause of everything should be evaluated not in terms of justiﬁed true belief but in terms of the intellectual
virtue of wisdom.
1. INTRODUCTION
William Alston has offered a deﬁnition of natural theology that is gaining acceptance. He
deﬁnes it as ‘the enterprise of providing support for religious beliefs by starting from
premises that neither are nor presuppose any religious beliefs.’1 This deﬁnition links
natural theology with epistemology and logic. For the ‘support’ in question is the
intellectual support for, or justiﬁcation of, religious beliefs, and the term ‘premises’
obviously belongs to the context of arguments. Thus natural theology is understood as
sound philosophical arguments in defence of a religion. Such an understanding agrees, of
course, with William Paley’s modern classic Natural Theology: Evidence of the Existence
and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature.2
However, in this paper I argue brieﬂy against this epistemological notion of natural
theology. I argue ﬁrst that the linking of natural theology to epistemology is invalid
historically, epistemologically, and metaphysically. I then proceed to argue that
knowledge claims about the ultimate cause of everything should be evaluated not in
terms of justiﬁed true belief but in terms of the intellectual virtue of wisdom.
2. NATURAL THEOLOGY
Let us start with the notion of natural theology.
First, conceiving natural theology epistemologically is historically problematic at least.
For several studies have in different ways established that it was only during the so-called
Enlightenment that natural theology began to be used in order to justify individual acts of
faith or religious belief.3 To justify individual acts of faith is clearly the business of, say,
John Locke, Immanuel Kant and William Paley. From the late seventeenth century to
most of the twentieth century universally accessible evidence for the existence and
revelation of God was generally thought to be necessary in order for faith to be justiﬁed.4
So, by linking natural theology with epistemology the project of evidentialist apologetics
developed.5 However, this epistemological notion of natural theology is at best historically
very narrow, if not anachronistic.
This leads us, second, to the question whether or not the epistemological assumptions of
this notion of natural theology are valid. Evidentialism (the theory of the necessity of
inferential evidence for the justiﬁcation of (religious) belief) is based on foundationalism
(the theory according to which there are two kinds of beliefs: basic and inferential ones).
However, even granting foundationalism, it does not follow that religious beliefs must be
inferential. Modern foundationalism just presumes that belief in God cannot be basic, and
(if at all) that there can only be inferential evidence for the existence of God. However,
whether we should be atheists, agnostics or theists cannot be validly assumed by
epistemology, but has to be argued by metaphysics.6
Third, natural theology need not and must not make any assumptions whether theistic
or atheistic. Traditionally natural theology is not a theological but a philosophical
discipline.7 For traditional metaphysics grows out of the recognition that some beings do
not depend on matter for their existence. Philosophy of nature (physica) culminates with a
demonstration of the efﬁcient cause of the material world. From the investigation of being
as such, or being as being, metaphysics maintains that every being of experience is
composite, imperfect and ﬁnite, and therefore requires an explanation in terms of
something else. Much traditional metaphysics then explains whatever exists or can exist –
why there is something rather than nothing – in terms of a ﬁrst cause. It is at this stage that
metaphysics is traditionally called ‘ﬁrst philosophy’, ‘natural theology’ or simply
‘theology’ (in a non-revelatory sense). For the absolutely independent ﬁrst cause is
commonly called ‘God’. Thus, traditionally natural theology is not an ‘enterprise of
providing support for religious beliefs’ but a self-standing philosophical discipline. For it
does not presuppose any ‘religious beliefs’, but only the possibility of immaterial being and
the intrinsic importance of the question why there is something rather than nothing. To be
sure, natural theology starts traditionally ‘from premises that neither are nor presuppose
any religious beliefs’, but not in order to provide ‘support for religious beliefs’.
So, whereas the epistemological notion of natural theology is not valid historically,
epistemologically and metaphysically, the traditional notion is valid.
3. EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
Having argued against the linking of natural theology with epistemology, I do not
however, deny the validity of evaluating truth claims. In particular can and ought the claim
that there is a God be evaluated.
I think, however, that we should not limit epistemology to a narrow view inherited from
the late seventeenth century. Epistemology on this narrow conception bases the evaluation
of knowledge on the notion of justiﬁed true belief. To many philosophers this approach
seems now to have come to an impasse in the debates over foundationalism and
coherentism on the one hand, and over externalism and internalism on the other.8 It is
moreover agents who believe and not beliefs that take on believers, and therefore the
evaluation of agents is more basic than that of beliefs. So, I suggest that we explore an
agent-based epistemology as opposed to a belief-based epistemology.
Focusing then on the knowing agent, it is generally held that the object of the power of
the intellect is to take things to be true.9 Now, the good of any power, or that which brings
a power to completion, is operation in accordance with its power. So the good of the
intellect is properly taking things to be true in the best possible way.
The activity of any human power can, moreover, be improved, enhanced, and so
become more effective in act. For our powers are indeterminate in operating either badly
or well. But we can choose to exercise any power to act well, not only accidentally, but
essentially. Such operative strength in between power and act is traditionally called
‘disposition’ (habitus) or ‘virtue’ (virtus). These perfections of human powers according to
their natures are called ‘dispositions’, because they take hold of both subject (persons) and
object (powers); and they are called ‘virtues’, because they strengthen the operation of
powers. In short, they bring a human power to completion in attaining whatever is its
good. Such dispositions are in turn speciﬁed according to the powers of which they are
perfections, and so they perfect either the intellect or the will by intellectual and moral
virtues respectively.
Epistemology does not, of course, evaluate moral virtues, but intellectual virtues.
Traditionally there are three virtues of the intellect: understanding (nous), scientiﬁc
reasoning (episteme) and wisdom (sophia).10 First, the intellectual virtue of understanding is
knowing something to be true on account of the meaning of the terms in which it is
expressed. Among such self-evident propositions are ‘something cannot both be and not
be in the same respect’ and ‘an extended whole is greater than any of its parts’. Although
the intellect has the power in itself to form such ﬁrst principles, it is an intellectual
disposition of forming them easily and accurately. Second, the intellectual virtue of
scientiﬁc reasoning is knowing why something is certainly true. It is, of course, also good to
know that something is probably true than not, but that does not perfect the intellect’s
power of holding something to be true. For knowing why something is true is better than
knowing that it is true. This disposition of reasoning is found in the sciences of nature,
mathematics, history, society and so forth. But, although the intellect has the power in
itself to form arguments, it is an intellectual disposition of forming such easily and
accurately. Last, the virtue of wisdom is knowing the ultimate cause of everything;
knowing why there is something rather than nothing. When wisdom is acquired the
intellect is fully perfected. For in order to reach such knowledge of everything that is
insofar as it is, habituation of the intellect both by understanding and scientiﬁc reasoning is
required. It is practised in what is traditionally called ﬁrst philosophy and metaphysics, or
simply (natural) theology, since it is taken to attain knowledge of God as the cause on
whom every being depends. Although the intellect has this power in itself to form
arguments about the ultimate cause of everything, it is an intellectual disposition or virtue
of forming such easily and accurately.
This agent-based approach to epistemology is preferable to the belief-based one in that
the good of wisdom – fromwhich philosophy even takes its name – cannot be analyzed as a
function of beliefs but as strictly dependent on the standpoint of a person. The advantage
of evaluating intellectual acts in this broader perspective, is also that wisdom is commonly
taken to inﬂuence not only knowledge but action, and arguments to the ultimate cause is
generally expected not only to change our minds but also our lives. Indeed, Aristotle
connects contemplation of the divine with human happiness.11 This stands in marked
contrast to conceiving natural theology merely as a matter of epistemology and logic. For
the wise person judges everything in relation to the ultimate cause easily and accurately.
He or she has been disposed to lead a life in connection with the cause of everything –
whatever it is. Wisdom has strengthened his or her intellect to perfection in contemplating
why there is something rather than nothing.12
4. CONCLUSION
So I conclude that we should not conceive natural or philosophical theology
epistemologically for historical, epistemological and metaphysical reasons. We should
rather consider it in accordance with tradition as a strictly metaphysical discipline. I
conclude also that we should not evaluate knowledge claims of why there is something
rather than nothing in terms of justiﬁed true belief, but in terms of the intellectual virtue of
wisdom.13
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